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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STEVEN FISHER,
Petitioner,
vs.
NANETTE FISHER,

Case No. 20010771-CA

Respondent,
STATE OF UTAH, Office of Recovery
Services,
Intervenor/Appellant,
M. DIRK EASTMOND,
Party-in-interest/Appellee/
Cross-Appellant.

INTERVENOR/APPELLANT'S REPLY AND ANSWER TO
BRIEF OF APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

I.

THE HAMPTON DECISION SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED TO
CHILD SUPPORT AS STATUTORILY REGULATED TODAY.

a.

Hampton Should Be Read In Light of the 1935 Prevailing Theory of
Alimony

The Court in its Eastmond decision relied on the 1935 Utah Supreme Court case of
Hampton v. Hampton, 85 Utah 338, 39 P.2d 703 (Utah 1935), stating that "the Utah
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Supreme Court has expressly allowed an attorney's lien to be satisfied from child support
payments." Eastmond v. Earh 912 P.2d 994, 997 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). In Hampton, the
sole award was for alimony but this Court in Eastmond extrapolated that alimony also
included child support. A brief review of The Historical Background of Alimony Law
and Its Present Structure, a 1939 article written by Chester G. Vernier & John B. Hurlbut
in 6, Law & Contemp. Probs. 197-200 (1939) reveals that at the time Hampton was
decided, alimony had a much different meaning and content.
Actually, however, the order for permanent alimony involved more than a
mere judicial measurement of the husband's legal duty as husband to
support the wife. If he acquired wealth from the wife by virtue of the
marriage, he could not be compelled to disgorge, but that fact was of
influence in fixing the amount of the award. Finally, in the minds of some
of the judges at least, the notion of punishment depending upon the degree
of the husband's moral delinquency played some part in the part of the
process. [PJermanent alimony to the guilty wife against whom the husband
secured a separation was judicially unthinkable.
Id. at 199.
A second article in the same journal states: "Some courts arrived at the figure of
one third of the husband's income as alimony by analogizing to dower." Edward W.
Cooey, The Exercise of Judicial Discretion in the Award of Alimony, 6 Law & Contemp.
Probs. 213, 221 (1939). It is interesting to note that a study done by The Institute of Law
of Johns Hopkins University of the divorce court actions in Ohio and Maryland during
1933 found that "[i]n the 1458 cases in which the number of dependents and the size of
the periodic payments were both known, the average award per actions was $9.04, figured

2
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

on a weekly basis." However, the study found that "[w]hen the award was made for the
wife alone, she received SI 1.66." Id. at 214. If alimony was in fact an award which
included child support, then one would expect that alimony awards for women with
children would be higher than alimony awards for women without children. The study
showed that just the opposite was true.
It appears from the statements of contemporaries to the Hampton decision that
permanent alimony was analogous to effecting a division of property rather than
providing support for the children of the parties. In addition, it appeared to serve as
punitive damages to the wronged party. Further, it appears that the awards for women
without children were traditionally higher than those awards for women with children
indicating that the courts did not factor in additional money which we would now
categorize as child support.
In light of the difference between what the Hampton court would have viewed as
the nature of alimony as evidenced by the previously quoted journal articles and child
support in its current form, Hampton should not be allowed to stand for the proposition
that an attorney's lien can attach to a present day Order for child support.
b.

Subsequent Legislative Enactments Render Hampton Inapplicable

If at the time Hampton was decided, the Court's ruling was that an attorney's lien
could attach to alimony, that holding became the common law. If the Court's ruling was
that an attorney's lien could attach to child support, that holding became common law.

3
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Black's Law Dictionary 276 (6th ed. 1990) defines common law as consisting "of those
principles, usage and rules of action applicable to government and security of persons and
property which do not rest for their authority upon any express and positive declaration of
the will of the legislature." (citing Bishop v. U.S., 334 F. Supp. 415, 418 (D.C. Tex.
1971)).
Regardless of which holding Hampton stands for, the Legislature has pre-empted
the common law on this point. In 1981, the Legislature enacted § 78-23-5(f) which
specifically states that child support is exempt from execution. Also in 1981, the
Legislature enacted § 78-23-6(1) which specifically states that alimony is exempt from
execution. The enactment of these statutes while not explicitly pre-empting Hampton
should be interpreted as doing so. Otherwise the statutes and common law principle
contained in Hampton are in conflict.
Sometimes courts, when facing the pre-emption question, find language in the...
statute that reveals an explicit [legislative] intent to pre-empt [common] law. [ii]
More often, explicit pre-emption language does not appear, or does not directly
answer the question. In that event, courts must consider whether the ... statute's
'structure and purpose' or nonspecific statutory language, nonetheless reveal a
clear but implicit pre-emptive intent.
Bishop v. Gentec, 2002 UT 36, f 9, 48 P.3d 218 (citing Barnett Bank of Marion County v.
Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 31, 116 S. Ct. 1103 (1996)).
Therefore, we look to the statute's structure and purpose to determine
whether it reflects an implied legislative intent to do so. We conclude that
the state statute and the common law principle are in conflict and that the
common law must necessarily give way to the statute.
Bishop, 2002 UT 36, f 9.

4
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The common law holding of Hampton must give way to the implied legislative
intent contained in Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5(f) or § 78-23-6(1). Eastmond should be
overturned because permitting it to stand allows a common law holding to pre-empt a
later-enacted statute or statutes.
II.

EASTMOND'S STATEMENT THAT THE LEGISLATURE
CONSIDERED EXEMPTING CHILD SUPPORT BUT CHOSE
NOT TO DO SO IS UNSUPPORTED BY THE RECORD OR
BY EVIDENCE.

While Eastmond makes the bold statement that 'The Utah State Legislature has
considered exempting child support from the pervasiveness of an attorney's lien but chose
not to do so when it met and revised the Attorney Lien Statute ...", there is nothing in the
record to substantiate such an assertion. Eastmond Brief at 15. Eastmond offers no
evidence to support his allegation and therefore, such an allegation is without basis in
fact.
III.

EASTMOND'S INTERPRETATION OF THE "ALLOWABLE
CLAIMS AGAINST EXEMPTION" STATUTE IS IN ERROR.

The State continues to assert that a conflict exists between Eastmond and the
controlling statutes, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-51-41, 78-23-5 and 78-23-10.
Both the State and Eastmond agree that the statute allowing an attorney to use a
lien in an attempt to collect fees does not specifically address whether that lien can be
executed upon child support. The statute simply allows "a lien upon the client's cause of
action or counterclaim, which attaches to any settlement, verdict, report, decision, or

5
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

judgment in the client's favor and to the proceeds thereof in whosoever hands they may
come...." Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-41 (1989).
There is no disagreement between the parties that Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5(f)
clearly states that "money or property received, and rights to receive money for property
for child support" is property designated as exempt from execution. The disagreement
between the parties exists as to the correct interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-10,
Allowable Claims Against Exempt Property. Eastmond interprets this statute as
empowering him to levy against child support. The State asserts that the correct
interpretation is that this statute specifically limits him from attaching child support.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-10(1) states that:
(a)

A creditor may levy against exempt property of any kind to enforce a
claim for:
(i)
alimony, support, or maintenance;
(ii)
unpaid earnings of up to one month's compensation or the
full-time equivalent of one month's compensation for personal
services of an employee; or
(iii) state or local taxes

(b)

A creditor may levy against exempt property to enforce a claim for:
(i)
the purchase price of the property or a loan made for the purpose
of enabling an individual to purchase the specific property used for
that purpose;
(ii)
labor or materials furnished to make, repair, improve, preserve, store,
or transport the specific property; and
(iii) a special assessment imposed to defray costs of a public
improvement benefitting the property.

The subsection limits with clarity the five enumerated claims that allow a creditor
to levy upon any kind of exempt property. An individual holding an attorney's lien is a
6
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lien creditor. "A creditor who has acquired a lien on the property involved by attachment,
levy or the like. . ." U.C.C. § 9-301 (1996). Therefore, since an attorney's lien is not one
of the enumerated claims allowed to levy upon any kind of exempt property, it is
prohibited from doing so.
Eastmond relies exclusively upon Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-10(2) to support his
allegation that an attorney's lien is statutorily allowed to levy upon any kind of exempt
property. Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-10(2) reads in its entirety as follows: 'This section
does not affect the right to enforce any statutory lien or security interest in exempt
property." This provision is not a blanket authorization for all who hold either a security
interest or statutory lien to levy upon any kind of exempt property. It merely reiterates
that found within the statutes of this state are specific authorizations or limitations upon
the various security interests or statutory liens and this specific section does not effect or
abrogate those individual authorizations or limitations. The statute authorizing an
attorney's lien does not specifically authorize execution against exempt property.
Therefore, § 78-23-10(2) is not applicable to attorney's liens.
For example, Utah Code Ann. § 38-3-1 creates a lessor's lien, the type of which
§ 78-23-10(2) has in mind. The lessor's lien statute provides in particularity that
"[ejxcept as hereinafter provided, lessors shall have a lien for rent due upon all
nonexempt property of the lessee brought or kept upon the lease premises so long as the

7
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

lessee shall occupy said premises and for thirty days thereafter." On its face, it appears to
prohibit a lessor from having a lien on any exempt property.
However, when we turn to Utah Code Ann. § 38-3-3, the lessor's lien statute
allows the attachment of a lessor's lien to the personal property of the lessee which is
upon the leased premises. A number of items of personal property are listed in the
Exemption statute. The specific language of the lessor's lien make a provision for an
occasion when a lessor's lien can attach to certain exempt property. A lessor's lien is not
one of the five categories in which a creditor can attach exempt property as set forth in
the Allowable Claims statute and as such could not attach any exempt property.
However, there is a section of the lessor's lien statute which identifies a specific occasion
wherein exempt property may be attached. Because of § 78-23-10(2), the provisions
allowing a lessor's lien to attach to certain exempt property remain undisturbed.
A holder of an attorney's lien is a creditor. A creditor is bound by the provisions
of § 78-23- 10(l)(a). As a result, an attorney's lien cannot attach to child support because
an attorney's lien is not one of the five enumerated claims that may levy against exempt
property.
The statute authorizing attorney's liens does not contain specific provisions
authorizing a levy upon any kind of exempt property. Therefore, there are no statutory
rights to be protected and § 78-23-10(2) is not applicable.

8
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The only reasonable interpretation of the Allowable Claims statute is that it serves
to limit those claims upon which general secured creditors or holders of liens may levy on
any exempt property. It also serves to insure that those secured creditors or holders of
statutory liens who have statutory rights to enforce on exempt property are not effected.
Further, Eastmond would have this Court rely on Lundy v. Cappuccio, 54 Utah
420, 181 P. 165 (Utah 1919), to support his assertion that his attorney's lien allows him to
seize child support collected by the Office of Recovery Services before it is disbursed to
the custodial parent. It is not possible to determine from the text of the case whether the
attorney's lien in Lundy sought to attach exempt or nonexempt property. Indeed, the case
concerns offsetting judgments and credits to be given as a result.
Eastmond states that Lundy "supports the concept that the attorney's lien attaches
to the judgment and proceeds thereof 'in whatsoever hands they may come."' Eastmond
Brief at 21. The issue before the Court is not whether an attorney's lien attaches to
proceeds but rather whether an attorney's lien attaches to proceeds which by statute are
exempt from execution. The State requests this Court to find that, under current statutes,
an attorney's lien cannot attach to child support and to thereby overturn Eastmond.
IV.

THE STATE IS BOUND BY FEDERAL REGULATIONS
AND WILL BE HELD TO STRICT COMPLIANCE.

The State is bound by 42 U.S.C.A. § 654(11)(B) which provides that: "any
payment required to be made under section 656 or 657 of this title to a family shall be
made to the resident parent, legal guardian, or caretaker relative having custody of or
9
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responsibility for the child or children[.]" If a family is receiving cash assistance from
certain State welfare programs, the State is authorized by federal statute to retain a
portion of child support it collects as reimbursement. The State is prohibited from
disbursing child support collected except as stated above. [A copy of 42 U.S.C.A. § 654
appears in Addendum A.]
Furthermore, the State will be held to the following:
(a) A State will be subject to a financial penalty and the
amounts otherwise payable to the State under title IV-A of the
Act will be reduced in accordance with § 305.66:
(1) if on the basis of:
(i)....
(ii)....
(iii) The results of an audit under § 305.60 of this part, the
State failed to substantially comply with one or more of the
requirements of the IV-D program, as defined in § 305.63;
and

(c) The payments for a fiscal year under title IV-A of the Act
will be reduced by the following percentages: (1) One to two
percent for the first finding under paragraph (a) of this
section; (2) Two to three percent for the second consecutive
finding; and (3) Not less than three percent and not more than
5 percent for the third or a subsequent consecutive finding.
The reduction will be made in accordance with the provisions
of 45 CFR 262.1 (b)-(e) and 262.7.
45 C.F.R. § 305.61 (2002). [A copy of 45 C.F.R. § 305.61 appears in Addendum A.]

10
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The federal agency which administers the Title IV-D support enforcement program
under the Secretary of Health and Human Services is the Office of Child Support
Enforcement. The Denver Office of that agency was contacted and asked to give an
opinion as to whether allowing an attorney's lien to intercept and redirect payment of
child support or alimony that is being collected through the Office of Recovery Services
would be considered non-compliance. The State was notified by e-mail from Diane
Degenhart, Program Specialist of that same office that, in her opinion, it would be
considered non-compliance.
Like the court system, federal agencies do not normally issue official, before-thefact opinions but rather rule on a case-by-case basis after the fact. While not an official
opinion, the information transmitted to the State by Ms. Degenhart should not be
summarily dismissed.
In addition, the State included in its original brief, Hodges v. Shalala, 121 F. Supp.
2d 854, 860 (D.S.C. 2000), as proof that the Secretary of Health and Human Services
takes seriously any and all violations of federal requirements. It also serves to illustrate
the magnitude of the penalties involved. The State of South Carolina brought action
against the Secretary of Health and Human Services seeking injunctive and declaratory
relief to prevent the loss of millions of dollars in federal funding with respect to its
inability to meet conditions imposed pursuant to Child Support Enforcement Act upon its
acceptance of federal funds. The United States District Court concluded that the
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Secretary did not have discretion to amend the statutory penalty structure for the State's
noncompliance and granted summary judgment as requested by the Secretary. The court
stated:
The federal laws state clearly and unequivocally that, as a condition of the
State's participation in the TANF Program, it must establish and operate the
child-support enforcement systems at issue. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 654-55
(1998). On the basis of the record in this case, the State has not denied that
it was aware that a failure to meet the requirements of Title IV-D would
cause a withdrawal of funding. Indeed, the State's knowledge of the nature
and gravity of the Title IV-D conditions is evidenced by its long and close
cooperation with the United States in an effort to meet its obligations.
Id. at 875.
The State of South Carolina argued, and it was not disputed, that the failure to
comply was the fault of a third party. Regardless of the origin of the noncompliance,
noncompliance still resulted in the loss of millions in federal funding.
Notwithstanding what the State has previously asserted and cited, Eastmond
believes that these requirements and subsequent penalties for noncompliance are only
"conjecture and speculation to support its argument that it might lose such funding if it is
required to honor the statutory attorney's lien." Eastmond Brief at 18. The State
has not conjured up the regulations and does not speculate when faced with the reality
that many states have learned for themselves the devastating consequences of
noncompliance. Hodges stands as a clear warning to Utah.
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V.

NOTWITHSTANDING FEDERAL PROHIBITIONS,
ALLOWING ANY ATTORNEY TO USE STATE MONEY
FOR HIS OWN PRIVATE GAIN IS AGAINST PUBLIC
POLICY.

Eastmond bases his argument that the Office of Recovery Services, funded by
taxpayer money, should be his private collection agency on curious reasoning:
"Otherwise, attorney's [sic] would be hesitant to take on case [sic] such as Respondent's
out of fear on [sic] not being compensated, which could lead to attorney's [sic] declining
to represent such individuals, such as Respondent who had no assets against which
Appellee could rely upon to be paid out of other than the child support owed to
Respondent." Eastmond Brief at 16.
Each attorney in this State makes a choice based on many factors when deciding
whether or not to represent an individual or entity. The client's ability to pay is usually
just one of the factors considered. Eastmond suggests it is the only factor. This
hyperbole does a great disservice to the many attorneys who serve the needs of the
citizens of Utah often at great personal cost.
Eastmond has failed to provide this Court with any case law contrary to Shipman v.
City of New York Collection Unit, 703 N.Y.S.2d 389 (N.Y. 2000). In addition, the State
is not aware of any case law in any jurisdiction contrary to Shipman.
The Court in Shipman found that even though the attorney had represented the
mother in a paternity and child support action which gave rise to his lien, his lien could
not attach to child support. However, the Court in Shipman specifically ruled on the issue
13
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of whether the support collection unit has the legal duty to redirect child support
payments and concluded: "[t]he support collection unit does not have a legal duty to
disburse any portion of the child support funds in its possession to an attorney asserting
an attorney's lien." Id. at 396. Permitting Eastmond to use the Office of Recovery
Services as his own private collection agency at taxpayer expense is a violation of federal
regulations and would result in severe penalties affecting those citizens who can least
afford to bear the burden. It would also defeat the public policy basis for the creation of
Title IV-D programs.
CONCLUSION
The Eastmond v. Earl decision should be overturned. The basis for the decision is
the 1935 Hampton case involving alimony which this Court has extrapolated to also mean
child support. Alimony does not include child support today and did not include child
support at the time Hampton was decided. Hampton does not stand for the proposition
that an attorney's lien can attach to child support as statutorily regulated today.
Hampton was decided in 1935. If the common law holding derived from that
decision was that an attorney's lien could attach to alimony, then the Legislature preempted the common law holding by enacting § 78-23-6(1) in 1981, which exempts
alimony or separate maintenance. If the common law holding derived from the Hampton
decision was that an attorney's lien could attach to child support, then the Legislature preempted the common law holding by enacting § 78-23-5(f) in 1981. In either case, the
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Legislature has pre-empted the common law and when there is a conflict between the
common law and the statute, the common law must give way to the statute.
The Court should overturn Eastmond because it has the authority to overturn its
prior decision when it would result in more good than harm and would resolve the
existing conflict among statutes. The conflict exists as a result of Eastmond's
interpretation of § 78-23-10(2). It is not logical to believe that the Legislature would
enact a statute that specifically excludes alimony and child support from execution, enact
a statute which enumerates only five instances in which a creditor may levy on any
exempt property, and then enact a third statute which nullifies the first two. Eastmond's
interpretation of § 78-23-10(2) is in error.
Allowing an attorney's lien to intercept child support arrears will have a
devastating impact on the participants in IV-D programs. The State stands in jeopardy of
losing vast amounts of federal funding if an attorney is permitted to use a taxpayer-funded
agency for his private gain because it is a direct violation of federal regulations and
violates the public policy underlying these programs. The Court should make it clear that
state and federal Title IV-D funds cannot be used to collect the fees of private attorneys
and allow the State to continue to be in compliance with the federal regulations. All of
this may be accomplished by overturning Eastmond.
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ANSWER BY INTERVENOR/APPELLANT TO CROSS-APPEAL

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a final order entered August 24, 2001, wherein the trial
court determined that the attorney's lien could attach to the past due child support
arrearages, but not to the ongoing support. Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(6) (Supp.
2000), appeals from final orders in domestic cases, handled by the district court, are taken
to the Court of Appeals as directed by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) (Supp. 2000).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
a.

Issue:
1.

Whether the District Court was correct in ruling that Appellee's

attorney's lien may not attach to current or future child support because ongoing or future
child support is the right of the child.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
There are no specific statutes to support the District Court ruling, but it is wellsettled in Utah case law that ongoing or future child support cannot be waived, bargained
away, or compromised in any manner by the parents because such support is the right of
the child.
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ARGUMENT
I.

A.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT
AN ATTORNEY'S LIEN CANNOT ATTACH TO
ONGOING OR FUTURE CHILD SUPPORT.

Ongoing or future child support belongs to the child.
Eastmond seeks to overturn the District Court's ruling prohibiting him from

attaching his attorney's lien to ongoing or future child support payments. It is well-settled
in the case law of this State that "the right of minor children to support cannot be bartered
away, extinguished, estopped or in any way defeated by the agreement or conduct of the
parents." Hills v. Hills, 638 P.2d 516, 517 (Utah 1981) (citations omitted).
Eastmond's lien arose as a result of an agreement entered into between Eastmond
and Nanette Fisher whereby he agreed to provide certain services and she agreed to pay
certain fees. The children of Mrs. Fisher were not parties to the agreement. Mrs. Fisher
cannot by any method barter, extinguish or assign future or ongoing child support. It is
not hers. The right to receive ongoing or future child support belongs to the child.
"Although child support is payable to the custodial parent, the right to child support
belongs to the child." State v. Sucecf 924 P.2d 882, 886 (Utah 1996) (citations omitted).
CONCLUSION
Eastmond's attorney's lien is based on a contractual agreement he had with
Nanette Fisher. Nanette Fisher cannot barter away or in any way extinguish her
children's right to receive child support. Eastmond has no contract or agreement with the
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children whose right it is to receive ongoing or future child support. The Distnct Court is
correct in ruling that Eastmond cannot use an attorney's lien arising out of an agreement
with the mother to attach child support that belongs to the children. The District Court
ruling should be affirmed.
The State respectfully requests oral argument and a published opinion.
Respectfully submitted this oZ^day of

October

2002.

MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

/

A/

Kaifaia K. Dixon
^
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for the State of Utah,
Office of Recovery Services,
Appellant/Intervenor
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Paee 1
42 USCA s< 654
42 U.S.C.A. § 654

f>
UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 42, THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE
CHAPTER 7-SOCIAL SECURITY
SUBCHAPTER IV-GRANTS TO STATES FOR AID AND SERVICES TO NEEDY FAMILIES WITH
CHILDREN AND FOR CHILD-WELFARE SERVICES
PART D-CH1LD SUPPORT AND ESTABLISHMENT OF PATERNITY
Copr. © West Group 2002. No claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
Current through P.L. 107-203, approved 7-24-02

j 654. State plan for child and spousal support

A State plan for child and spousal support must(1) provide that it shall be in effect in all political subdivisions of the State;
(2) provide for financial participation by the State;
(3) provide for the establishment or designation of a single and separate organizational unit, which meets such staffing
and organizational requirements as the Secretary may by regulation prescribe, within the State to administer the plan;
(4) provide that the State will-(A) provide services relating to the establishment of paternity or the establishment, modification, or enforcement of
child support obligations, as appropriate, under the plan with respect t o (i) each child for whom (I) assistance is provided under the State program funded under part A of this subchapter, (II)
benefits or services for foster care maintenance are provided under the State program funded under part E of this
subchapter, (III) medical assistance is provided under the State plan approved under subchapter XIX of this chapter, or
(IV) cooperation is required pursuant to section 6(1)( 1) of the Food Stamp Act of 1977 (7U.S.C. 2015(1KP), unless, in
accordance with paragraph (29), good cause or other exceptions exist;
(ii) any other child, if an individual applies for such services with respect to the child; and
(B) enforce any support obligation established with respect to—
(i) a child with respect to whom the State provides services under the plan; or
(ii) the custodial parent of such a child;
(5) provide that (A) in any case in which support payments are collected for an individual with respect to whom an
assignment pursuant to section 608(a)(3) of this title is effective, such payments shall be made to the State for distribution
pursuant to section 657 of this title and shall not be paid directly to the family, and the individual will be notified on a
monthly basis (or on a quarterly basis for so long as the Secretary determines with respect to a State that requiring such
notice on a monthly basis would impose an unreasonable administrative burden) of the amount of the support payments
collected, and (B) in any case in which support payments are collected for an individual pursuant to the assignment made
under section 1396k of this title, such payments shall be made to the State for distribution pursuant to section 1396k of
this title, except that this clause shall not apply to such payments for any month after the month in which the individual
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Pase 2
ceases to be eligible for medical assistance:
(6) provide that—
(A) services under the plan shall be made available to residents of other States on the same terms as to residents of the
State submitting the plan.
(B) an application fee for furnishing such services shall be imposed on an individual, other than an mdividual receiving
assistance under a State program funded under part A or E of this subchapter, or under a State plan approved under
subchapter XIX of this chapter, or who is required by the State to cooperate with the State agency administering the
program under this part pursuant to subsection (1) or (m) of section 2015 of Title 7, and shall be paid by the individual
applying for such services, or recovered from the absent parent, or paid by the State out of its own funds (the payment
of which from State funds shall not be considered as an administrative cost of the State for the operation of the plan, and
shall be considered income to the program), the amount of which
(i) will not exceed $25 (or such higher or lower amount (which shall be uniform for all States) as the Secretary may
determine to be appropriate for any fiscal year to reflect increases or decreases in administrative costs), and
(ii) may vary among such individuals on the basis of ability to pay (as determined by the State),
(C) a fee of not more than S25 may be imposed in any case where the State requests the Secretary of the Treasury to
withhold past-due support owed to or on behalf of such individual from a tax refund pursuant to section 664(a)(2) of this
title,
(D) a fee (in accordance with regulations of the Secretary) for performing genetic tests may be imposed on any
individual who is not a recipient of assistance under a State program funded under part A of this subchapter, and
(E) any costs in excess of the fees so imposed may be collected—
(i) from the parent who owes the child or spousal support obligation involved; or
(ii) at the option of the State, from the individual to whom such services are made available, but only if such State has
in effect a procedure whereby all persons in such State having authority to order child or spousal support are informed
that such costs are to be collected from the individual to whom such services were made available;
(7) provide for entering into cooperative arrangements with appropriate courts and law enforcement officials and Indian
tribes or tribal organizations (as defined in subsections (e) and (1) of section 450b of Title 25) (A) to assist the agency
administering the plan, including the entering mto of financial arrangements with such courts and officials in order to
assure optimum results under such program, and (B) with respect to any other matters of common concern to such courts
or officials and the agency administering the plan;
(8) provide that, for the purpose of establishing parentage, establishing, setting the amount of, modifying, or enforcing
child support obligations, or making or enforcing a child custody or visitation determination, as defined in section
663(d)(1) of this title, the agency administering the plan will establish a service to locate parents utiiizing(A) all sources of information and available records; and
(
(B) the Federal Parent Locator Service established under section 653 of this title,

and shall, subject to the privacy safeguards required under paragraph (26), disclose only the information described in
sections 653 and 663 of this title to the authorized persons specified in such sections for the purposes specified in such
sections;
(9) provide that the State will, in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary, cooperate with any other
StateCopr. © West 2002 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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Paee 3
(A) in establishing paternity, if necessary:
(B) in locating a noncustodial parent residing in the State (whether or not permanently) against whom any action is
being taken under a program established under a plan approved under this pan in another State;
(C) in securing compliance by a noncustodial parent residing in such State (whether or not permanently) with an order
issued by a court of competent jurisdiction against such parent for the support and maintenance of the child or children
or the parent of such child or children with respect to whom aid is being provided under the plan of such other State;
(D) in carrying out other functions required under a plan approved under this part; [FN1] and
(E) not later than March 1,1997, in using the forms promulgated pursuant to section 652(a)( 11) of this title for income
withholding, imposition of liens, and issuance of administrative subpoenas in interstate child support cases;
(10) provide that the State will maintain a full record of collections and disbursements made under the plan and have
an adequate reporting system;
(11)(A) provide that amounts collected as support shall be distributed as provided in section 657 of this title; and
(B) provide that any payment required to be made under section 656 or 657 of this title to a family shall be made to the
resident parent, legal guardian, or caretaker relative havmg custody of or responsibility for the child or children;
(12) provide for the establishment of procedures to require the State to provide individuals who are applying for or
receiving services under the State plan, or who are parties to cases in which services are being provided under the State
plan(A) with notice of all proceedings in which support obligations might be established or modified; and
(B) with a copy of any order establishing or modifying a child support obligation, or (in the case of a petition for
modification) a notice of determination that there should be no change in the amount of the child support award, within
14 days after issuance of such order or determination;
(13) provide that the State will comply with such other requirements and standards as the Secretary determines to be
necessary to the establishment of an effective program for locating noncustodial parents, establishing paternity, obtaining
support orders, and collecting support payments and provide that information requests by parents who are residents of
other States be treated with the same priority as requests by parents who are residents of the State submitting the plan;
(14)(A) comply with such bonding requirements, for employees who receive, disburse, handle, or have access to, cash,
as the Secretary shall by regulations prescribe;
(B) maintain methods of administration which are designed to assure that persons responsible for handling cash receipts
shall not participate in accounting or operating functions which would permit them to conceal in the accounting records
the misuse of cash receipts (except that the Secretary shall by regulations provide for exceptions to this requirement in
the case of sparsely populated areas where the hiring of unreasonable additional staff would otherwise be necessary);
(15) provide for—
(A) a process for annual reviews of and reports to the Secretary on the State program operated under the State plan
approved under this part, including such information as may be necessary to measure State compliance with Federal
requirements for expedited procedures, using such standards and procedures as are required by the Secretary, under
which the State agency will determine the extent to which the program is operated in compliance with this part; and
(B) a process of extracting from the automated data processing system required by paragraph (16) and transmitting to
the Secretary data and calculations concerning the levels of accomplishment (and rates of improvement) with respect to
applicable performance indicators (including paternity establishment percentages) to the extent necessary for purposes
of sections 652(g) and 658 of this title;
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Paee 4
(16) provide, for the establishment and operation by the State agency in accordance with an (initial and annually
updated) advance automated data processing planning document approved under section 652(d) of this title, of a
statewide automated data processing and information retrieval system meeting the requirements of section o54a of this
title designed effectively and efficiently to assist management m the administration of the State plan, so as to control,
account for. and momtor all the factors in the support enforcement collection and paternity determination process under
such plan;
(17) provide that the State will have in effect an agreement with the Secretary entered into pursuant to section 663 of
this title for the use of the Parent Locator Service established under section 653 of this title, and provide that the State
will accept and transmit to the Secretary requests for information authorized under the provisions of the agreement to
be furnished by such Service to authorized persons, will impose and collect (in accordance with regulations of the
Secretary) a fee sufficient to cover the costs to the State and to the Secretary incurred by reason of such requests, will
transmit to the Secretary from time to time (in accordance with such regulations) so much of the fees collected as are
attributable to such costs to the Secretary so incurred, and during the period that such agreement is in effect will
otherwise comply with such agreement and regulations of the Secretary with respect thereto;
(18) provide that the State has in effect procedures necessary to obtain payment of past-due support from overpayments
made to the Secretary of the Treasury as set forth in section 664 of this title, and take all steps necessary to implement
and utilize such procedures:
(19) provide that the agency administering the plan(A) shall determine on a penodic basis, from information supplied pursuant to section 508 of the Unemployment
Compensation Amendments of 1976, whether any individuals receiving compensation under the State's unemployment
compensation law (including amounts payable pursuant to any agreement under any Federal unemployment compensation
law) owe child support obligations which are being enforced by such agency; and
(B) shall enforce any such child support obligations which are owed by such an individual but are not being met(i) through an agreement with such individual to have specified amounts withheld from compensation otherwise
payable to such individual and by submitting a copy of any such agreement to the State agency administering the
unemployment compensation law; or
(ii) in the absence of such an agreement, by bringing legal process (as defined in section 659(i)(5) of this title) to
require the withholding of amounts from such compensation; and
(20) provide, to the extent required by section 666 of this title, that the State (A) shall have in effect all of the laws to
improve child support enforcement effectiveness which are referred to m that section, and (B) shall implement the
procedures which are prescribed in or pursuant to such laws;
(21)(A) at the option of the State, impose a late payment fee on all overdue support (as defined in section 666(e) of
this title) under any obligation being enforced under this part, in an amount equal to a uniform percentage determined
by the State (not less than 3 percent nor more than 6 percent) of the overdue support, which shall be payable by the
noncustodial parent owing the overdue support; and
(B) assure that the fee will be collected in addition to, and only after full payment of, the overdue support, and that the
imposition of the late payment fee shall not directly or indirectly result in a decrease in the amount of the support which
is paid to the child (or spouse) to whom, or on whose behalf, it is owed;
(22) in order for the State to be eligible to receive any incentive payments under section 658 of this title, provide that,
if one or more political subdivisions of the State participate in the costs of carrying out activities under the State plan
during any period, each such subdivision shall be entitled to receive an appropriate share (as determined by the State)
of any such incentive payments made to the State for such period, taking mto account the efficiency and effectiveness
of the activities carried out under the State plan by such political subdivision;
(23) provide that the State will regularly and frequently publicize, through public service announcements, the
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Page 5
availability of child support enforcement services under the plan and otherwise, including information as to any
application fees for such services and a telephone number or postal address at which further information may be obtained
and will publicize the availability and encourage the use of procedures for voluntary establishment of paternity and child
support by means the State deems appropnate;
(24) provide that the State will have in effect an automated data processing and information retrieval system(A) by October 1, 1997, which meets all requirements of this part which were enacted on or before October 13, 1988;
and
(B) by October 1, 2000. which meets all requirements of this part enacted on or before August 22, 1996, except that
such deadline shall be extended by 1 day for each day (if any) by which the Secretary fails to meet the deadline imposed
by section 344(a)(3) of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996;
(25) provide that if a family with respect to which services are provided under the plan ceases to receive assistance
under the State program funded under part A of this subchapter, the State shall provide appropnate nonce to the family
and continue to provide such services, subject to the same conditions and on the same basis as in the case of other
individuals to whom services are furnished under the plan, except that an application or other request to continue
services shall not be required of such a family and paragraph (6)(B) shall not apply to the family;
(26) have in effect safeguards, applicable to all confidential information handled by the State agency, that are designed
to protect the privacy rights of the parties, lncludmg—
(A) safeguards against unauthorized use or disclosure of information relating to proceedings or actions to establish
paternity, or to establish, modify, or enforce support, or to make or enforce a child custody determination;
(B) prohibitions against the release of information on the whereabouts of 1 party or the child to another party against
whom a protective order with respect to the former party or the child has been entered;
(C) prohibitions against the release of information on the whereabouts of 1 party or the child to another person if the
State has reason to believe that the release of the information to that person may result in physical or emotional harm to
the party or the child. [FN2]
(D) in cases in which the prohibitions under subparagraphs (B) and (C) apply, the requirement to notify the Secretary,
for purposes of section 653(b)(2) of this title, that the State has reasonable evidence of domestic violence or child abuse
against a party or the child and that the disclosure of such information could be harmful to the party or the child; and
(E) procedures providing that when the Secretary discloses information about a parent or child to a State court or an
agent of a State court described in section 653(c)(2) or 663(d)(2)(B) of this title, and advises that court or agent that the
Secretary has been notified that there is reasonable evidence of domestic violence or child abuse pursuant to section
653(b)(2) of this title, the court shall determme whether disclosure to any other person of information received from the
Secretary could be harmful to the parent or child and, if the court determines that disclosure to any other person could
be harmful, the court and its agents shall not make any such disclosure;
(27) provide that, on and after October 1, 1998, the State agency will(A) operate a State disbursement unit in accordance with section 654b of this title; and
(B) have sufficient State staff (consistmg of State employees) and (at State option) contractors reporting directly to the
State agency t o (i) monitor and enforce support collections through the unit in cases being enforced by the State pursuant to section
654(4) of this title (including carrying out the automated data processing responsibilities described m section 654A(g)
of this title); and
(ii) take the actions described in section 666(c)(1) of this title in

appropnate cases;
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Paee 6
(28) provide that, on and after October 1, 1997, the State will operate a State Directory of New Hires in accordance
with section 653a of this titie:
(29) provide that the State agency responsible for administering the State plan(A) shall make the determination (and redetermination at appropriate intervals) as to whether an mdividual who has
applied for or is receiving assistance under the State program funded under part A of this subchapter, the State program
under part E of this subchapter, the State program under subchapter XIX of this chapter, or the food stamp program, as
defined under section 3(h) of the Food Stamp Act of 1977 (7U.S.C. 2012(h)), is cooperating in good faith with the State
in establishing the paternity of. or in establishing, modifying, or enibrcing a support order for, any child of the individual
by providing the State agency with the name of, and such other information as the State agency may require with respect
to, the noncustodial parent of the child, subject to good cause and other exceptions which(i) in the case of the State program funded under part A of this subchapter, the State program under part E of this
subchapter, or the State program under subchapter XIX of this chapter shall, at the option of the State, be defined, taking
into account the best interests of the child, and applied in each case, by the State agency administering such program;
and
(ii) in the case of the food stamp program, as defined under section 3(h) of the Food Stamp Act of 1977 (7 U.S.C.
2012(h)), shall be defined and applied in each case under that program in accordance with section 6(1)(2) of the Food
Stamp Act of 1977 (7 U.S.C. 2015(1X2)):
(B) shall require the individual to supply additional necessary information and appear at interviews, hearings, and legal
proceedings;
(C) shall require the individual and the child to submit to genetic tests pursuant to judicial or administrative order;
(D) may request that the individual sign a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity, after notice of the rights and
consequences of such an acknowledgment, but may not require the individual to sign an acknowledgment or otherwise
relinquish the right to genenc tests as a condition of cooperation and eligibility for assistance under the State program
funded under part A of this subchapter, the State program under part E of this subchapter, the State program under
subchapter XIX of this chapter, or the food stamp program, as defined under section 3(h) of the Food Stamp Act of 1977
(7 U.S.C. 2012(h)); and
(E) shall promptly notify the individual and the State agency administering the State program funded under part A of
this subchapter, the State agency administering the State program under part E of this subchapter, the State agency
administering the State program under subchapter XIX of this chapter, or the State agency administering the food stamp
program, as defined under section 3(h) of the Food Stamp Act of 1977 (7 U.S.C. 2012(h)), of each such determination,
and if noncooperation is determined, the basis therefor;
(30) provide that the State shall use the definitions established under section 652(a)(5) of this title in collecting and
reporting information as required under this part;
(31) provide that the State agency will have in effect a procedure for certifying to the Secretary, for purposes of the
procedure under section 652(k) of this title, determmations that individuals owe arrearages of child support in an amount
exceeding $5,000, under which procedure(A) each individual concerned is afforded notice of such determination and the consequences thereof, and an
opportunity to contest the determination; and
(B) the certification by the State agency is furnished to the Secretary in such format, and accompanied by such
supporting documentation, as the Secretary may require;
(32)( A) provide that any request for services under this part by a foreign reciprocating country or a foreign country with
which the State has an arrangement descnbed in section 659a(d) of this title shall be treated as a request by a State;
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Paee 7
(B) provide, at State option, notwithstanding paragraph (4) or any other provision of this part, for services under the
plan for enforcement of a spousal support order not described in paragraph (4)(B) entered by such a country (or
subdivision): and
(C) provide that no applications will be required from, and no costs will be assessed for such services against, the
foreign reciprocating country or foreign obligee (but costs may at State option be assessed against the obligor); and
(33) provide that a State that receives funding pursuant to section 628 of this title and that has within its borders Indian
country (as defined in section 1151 of Title 18) may enter into cooperative agreements with an Indian tnbe or tnbal
organization (as defined in subsections (e) and (1) of section 450b of Title 25), if the Indian tnbe or tnbal organization
demonstrates that such tnbe or organization has an established tribal court system or a Court of Indian Offenses with the
authonty to establish paternity, establish, modify, or enforce support orders, or to enter support orders in accordance with
child support guidelines established or adopted by such tribe or organization, under which the State and tnbe or
organization shall provide for the cooperative delivery of child support enforcement services in Indian country and for
the forwarding of all collecnons pursuant to the functions performed by the tribe or organization to the State agency, or
conversely, by the State agency to the tribe or organization, which shall distribute such collections in accordance with
such agreement.

The State may allow the junsdiction which makes the collection involved to retain any application fee under paragraph
(6)(B) or any late payment fee under paragraph (21). Nothing m paragraph (33) shall void any provision of any
cooperative agreement entered into before August 22, 1996, nor shall such paragraph depnve any State of jurisdiction
over Indian country (as so defined) that is lawfully exercised under section 1322 of Title 25.
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Aug. 13, 1981. Pub.L. 97-35. Title XXIII. SS 2331(b). 2332(d). 2333(a), (b), 2335(a). 95 Stat. 860, 862, 863; Sept.
3, 1982. Pub.L. 97-248. Title I, $$ 171(a). (b)( 1), 173(a). 96 Stat. 401, 403; July 18,1984. Pub.L. 98-369, Div. B, Title
VI, § 2663(c)(14), (j)(2)(B)(x), 98 Stat. 1166, 1170; Aug. 16, 1984. Pub.L. 98-378. $g 3(a). (c) to (f). 5(b). 6(a).
11(b)(1), 12(a). (b). 14(a), 2 Ud). 98 Stat. 1306, 1310, 1311, 1314. 1318, 1319, 1320, 1324; Dec. 22. 1987. Pub.L.
100-203. Title IX. S3 9141(a)(2). 9142(a). 101 Stat. 1330-321, 1330-322; Oct. 13, 1988. Pub.L. 100-485. Title I. $$
104(a). 111(c). 123(a), (d). 102 Stat. 2348, 2349, 2352, 2353; Oct. 12, 1995. Pub.L. 104-35. § 1(a). 109 Stat. 294;
Aug. 22, 1996. Pub.L. 104-193, Title I. § 108(c)( 11). (12), Title III. S3 301(a). (b). 302(b)(2). 303(a). 304(a). 312(a).
3 13(a). 316(g)( 1), 324(b). 332. 333. 342(a). 343(b). 344(a)(1). (4), 370(a)(2). 371(b). 375(a). (c). 395(d)(l )(D). (2KB),
110 Stat. 2166,2199,2204,2205,2207,2209,2218.2223,2230,2233.2234,2236,2252,2254,2256,2259,2260; Aug.
5, 1997, Pub.L. 105-33, Title V. 53 5531(a), 5542(c). 5545. 5546(a). 5548. 5552.5556(b), 111 Stat. 625, 631, 633,635,
637; Dec. 14, 1999. Pub.L. 106-169. Title IV. 3 401(g), (h). 113 Stat. 1858.)

FFN11 So in original. The semicolon should probably be a comma.

ITN21 So in original. The period probably should be a semicolon.
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CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS
TITLE 45-PUBLIC WELFARE
SUBTITLE B-REGULAT1QNS RELATING TO
PUBLIC WELFARE
CHAPTER HI-OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT
ENFORCEMENT (CHILD SUPPORT
ENFORCEMENT
PROGRAM), ADMINISTRATION
FOR
CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES
PART 305--PROGRAM PERFORMANCE
MEASURES, STANDARDS, FINANCIAL
INCENTIVES, AND
PENALTIES
Current through July 19, 2002; 67 FR 47660

$305.61 Penalty for failure to meet IV-D requirements.

(a) A State will be subject to a financial penalty and the
amounts otherwise payable to the State under title IV-A
of the Act will be reduced in accordance with § 305.66:
(1) If on the basis of:
(i) Data submitted by the State or the results of an audit
conducted under § 305.60 of this part, the State's
program failed to achieve the paternity establishment
percentages, as defined in section 452(g)(2) of the Act
and § 305.40 of this part, or to meet the support order
establishment and current collections performance
measures as set forth in § 305.40 of this part; or
(ii) The results of an audit under § 305.60 of this part,
the State did not submit complete and reliable data, as
defined in § 305.1 of the part; or

the first quarter throughout which the State, as
appropriate:
(1) Has achieved the paternity establishment
percentages, the order establishment or the current
collections performance measures set forth in § 305.40
of this part;
(2) Is in substantial compliance with IV-D
requirements as defined in § 305.63 of this part; or
(3) Has submitted data that are determined to be
complete and reliable.
(c) The payments for a fiscal year under title IV-A of
the Act will be reduced by the following percentages:
(1) One to two percent for the first finding under
paragraph (a) of this section;
(2) Two to three percent for the second consecutive
finding; and
(3) Not less than three percent and not more than 5
percent for the third or a subsequent consecutive
finding.
(d) The reduction will be made in accordance with the
provisions of 45 CFR 262.1(b)-(e) and 262.7.
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(iii) The results of an audit under § 305.60 of this part,
the State failed to substantially comply with one or
more of the requirements of the IV-D program, as
defined in § 305.63; and
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(2) With respect to the immediately succeeding fiscal
year, the State failed to take sufficient corrective action
to achieve the appropriate performance levels or
compliance or the data submitted by the State are still
incomplete and unreliable.
(b) The reductions under paragraph (c) of this section
will be made for quarters following the end of the
corrective action year and will continue until the end of
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